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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

statute is intended to take the place of that required at common
law. 8
From this discussion it is submitted that our court, in speaking
of the West Virginia statute as being mandatory in respect to the
changes made in the common law notice for terminating a year to
year tenancy, is consistent with the dicta of prior West Virginia
cases and in accord with the courts in other jurisdictions which
have passed on the point.
B. D. T.

Wuffs AmT ADINISTRATION TENT OF TESTATOR.

-By

ABATEMENT OF LEGACmS -

IN-

the sixth paragraph of her will, executed

in 1928, T bequeathed the sum of $10,000 to A, as part of a carefully worked out testamentary scheme disposing of an estate appraised at approximately $250,000. In the seventh, eighth and
ninth paragraphs' immediately following, she made gifts of realty
and specific personalty to other beneficiaries- the last of these
provisions being the bequest of the contents-of a safety-deposit box.
The tenth paragraph of the will specifically provided that all such
devises and legacies should be "free of all inheritance, estate and
other death taxes". Ten years later, T executed an instrument in
due form, purporting to "make, publish and redeclare" a codicil
to this will, and by the terms of the later instrument bequeathed
the sum of $5,000 to B. Apart from necessary modification as to
the executorship, this later publication made no other alteration in
the elaborate testamentary dispositions of 1928. On the death of
T in June, 1938, the appraisal of her estate indicated that its assets were inadequate to satisfy the sums of money bequeathed to A
and B, the specific gifts contained in the seventh, eighth and ninth
paragraphs, and the expenses of administration, including estate
and inheritance taxes. Held, that to satisfy administration expenses, including taxes, there must be an abatement of all testanentary benefits, and that in such abatement, the sums of money
given to A and B, as constituting general legacies must first abate
in favor of the gifts under the seventh, eighth and ninth para13Leavitt v. Leavitt, 47 N. H. 329 (1867) ; Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304
(1854) ; Nelson v. Ware, 57 Kan. 670, 47 Pac. 540 (1897) ; Howard v. Merriam,
5 Cush. 563 (Mass. 1850).
1 Paragraph seven devised the family home, and bequeathed household furniture, clothing, jewelry, etc. Paragraph eight created a trust in various types
of securities, and the ninth paragraph bequeathed II all of the securities which
I"
at the time of my death shall be located in my safety deposit box ....
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graphs of the will. Heller v. National Bank of West Virginia at
Wheeling.2
Two important principles of testamentary conclusion were
before the court in the instant litigation. In the first place, the
intent of the testator must always be the dominating consideration
- to which all rules of presumed intent will perforce yield-if

there be any evidence whatsoever as to the meaning of the will
taken as a whole.3 Particularly is this true where, as here, there
was a carefully worked out method for distribution of the testatrix' estate, precise in detail.4 The second principle of construction
is that general legacies must abate prior to specific gifts, in the
absence of testamentary intent to the contrary.' It must be noted,
however, that the latter principle is not a rule of property defeating intent, such as the rule against perpetuities or the rule in
233 F. Supp. 250 (N. . W. Va. 1940).
S1... the c rdinal rule controlling the interpretation of wills

...'' is "the
intention of the testator....I" Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 313, 27 S.
E. 389 (1897); Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527 (1890); Couch v.
Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23 (1887). Intent is "the guiding star".
Marcy v. Graham, 142 Va. 285, 299, 128 S. E. 550 (1925).
"It is only where the will affords no satisfactory clue to the real intention
of the testator, say the decisions, that courts may from necessity, resort to
legal presumptions and rules of construction, and then such rules must yield

to the apparent intention of the testator, expressed in his will ....

N"eal

v. 4Hamilton Co., 70 W. Va. 250, 256, 73 S. E. 971 (1912).
Paragraph one covered the usual clause for payment of debts, funeral
expenses, and costs of administration. Item two gave three general bequests
to as many charities, items three and four making general bequests to certain
other designated charities. Paragraph five provided for four general legacies
if the legatees survived the testator. Plaintiff in the case was given one of two
general bequests set forth in paragraph six. Items seven, eight and nine bequeathed and devised certain designated articles and securities, mentioned in
note 1, supra. All such foregoing dispositions were made free of death taxes
by paragraph ten; a minutely drafted residuary clause was set forth in eleven;
and executors were named in the twelfth paragraph. The codicil redeclared
the original will, gave another general legacy, added another executor to succeed one who had died, and provided for contingencies, including any other
executor's later proving unavailable.
U The legal presumption is that the testator intended that general legacies
should be paid out of his personal estate only, and if that is not sufficient, the
legacies fail. Read v. Cather's Adm'r, 18 W. Va. 263 (1881). General
legacies abate ratably among themselves for the payment of debts before
either specific or demonstrative legacies. Myers v. Myers, 88 Va. 131, 13 S. E.
346 (1891); 1 HARisoN, WmLs & ADuN

IsTRATIoN
(1927) § 296 (2).

Rarely does the testator contemplate an insufficiency of assets, and generally
fails to provide for such a contingency in his will. Thus certain general
standards have been developed providing an order of abatement, on the theory
that they thereby give effect to the probable intent of the average testator.
2 PAGE, WM.LS (2d ed. 1928) § 1311. By singling out a specific bequest, the
testator presumably intends that the legatee shall take prior to those general
legatees whose bequests are not specifically designated. 2 Woxm-z, ArDmsTRATioN (1889) § 452.
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Shelley's Case. Thus it has often been held that the ordinary
practice of abatement of general legacies may be disregarded in
order to give effect to the prevailing intent of the testamentary
dispositions. 7 Where a testator gave $2,000 to A, $5,000 to B, and
a house to be sold and the proceeds held in trust for C, upon an
insufficiency of assets appearing, the two general legacies were paid
out of the proceeds of the sale of the house. The court did not believe it was the testator's intent to effect a will that first gave
two pecuniary legacies, then "practically wipes out these two
gifts, distributing all the available property to another set of persons. " s In Matter of Crouse, the testator gave a stated sum to his
wife, reserving from the residue specific articles to the use of a
son. The court held that the general legacy to the wife came first,
stating "otherwise we would say that either the testator or the
law mocked the widow with a mere polite phrase, not having or
intended to have any efficacy."' 0 It has been stated that the mere
fact that the testator made such general legacies indicated that
he meant them to be paid, and if no other personalty than that
given by specific bequests is available, then such personalty must
first satisfy the general bequests." There are other instances of
the courts' disposition to go contrary to the general order of
abatement in order to effectuate further the testator's intent,1 and
6 "In any given ease, however, the intention of the testator can overcome nnd
supersede these rules of thumb." In re Hochster's Will, 166 Misc. 621, 2 X.
Y. S. (2d) 962, 964 (1938).
"A rule of construction always contains the saving clause, 'unless a contrary
intention appear by the will': . . . . On the other hand, a rule of law which
is not a rule of construction . . . acts independently of intention, and applies
to dispositions of property in whatever form of words expressed."
HAWXCINS,
CoNsTRucTIoN OF WrLLs (2d ed. 1885) vii. Hawkins reiterates that the rules
of construction applied to wills are not rules of law.
It is often the tendency for a rule of construction when followed frequently,
acquiring more and more authority, to be regarded and aplied like a rule of
law. See 7 HoLDsWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENO.IsH LAW (1926) 395 et veq.
7 Where there was no other personalty to sustain a general legacy other than
that given in a specific bequest, in holding that the latter must yield, the court
stated 'that the general legacy is to be raised out of the personal estate,
although specifically bequeathed. For, it is not to be supposed that the testator
meant to mock the legatee."
Biddle v. Carraway, 59 N. C. 95, 102 (1860).
Presuming that a will is drawn honestly and in good faith, when the testator
provided a legacy he must have intended that it should be paid in full. In re
Smallman's Will, 138 Misc. 889, 247 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1931).
8 Torchianals Estate, 292 Pa. 470, 474, 475, 141 AtI. 294 (1928).
9 244 N. Y. 400, 155 N. E. 685 (1927), reversing the lower court's contrary
holding, 215 App. Div. 736, 212 N. Y. Supp. 794.
10 Matter of Crouse, 244 N. Y. 400, 405, 155 N. E. 685 (1927).
"L Biddle v. Carraway, 59 N. C. 95 (1860).
12 In such instances, the facts and surrounding circumstances, as well as the
precise provisions of the will, are important, since a decision may turn on
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the instant. case must accordingly be viewed in the light of these
departures. In substance, the court has held that the direction in
the tenth paragraph of the will exonerating all testamentary gifts
from inheritance taxes, as well as the republication of the will by
codicil less than five months before the testatrix' death, did not
suffice to take its facts out of the general policy as to abatement.
In reaching that conclusion, the court's opinion did not advert to
the apparent intent of the testatrix, through her lengthy testamentary dispositions, to effect an equitable distribution of her
property, nor to the fact that the ninth paragraph generally disposed of securities which at her death might be found in her safetydeposit box.' 3 It would thus seem that the present decision accords ,with the policy of a more narrow interpretation of intent,
following the orthodox view which would require a substantial and
explicit clue as to the testator's intent, where abatement in one
fashion or another has become necessary.
J. S.M.
whether or not there is a substantial clue as to the testator 's intent. In the
case of In re Day's Estate, 150 Misc. 691, 271 N. Y. Supp. 170 (1934),
specific gifts were mentioned in a residuary disposition, but the court construed them as general legacies in order to give full effect to a general bequest
to testatrix' aged husband, who was then given preference to the assets. In
one decision, a trust fund to A for life was abated to sustain general legacies
to other beneficiaries, where insufficiency of assets would otherwise lead to the
abatement of testator's general legacies and "the partial destruction of his
main testamentary scheme." Matter of Title G. & T. Co., 195 N. Y. 339, 345,
88 N. E. 375 (1909). See ScHOULER, WmLs (3d ed. 1901) § 466. Cf. In re
Ward's Estate, 165 Misc. 165, 300 N. Y. Supp. 826 (1937) (considering the
remainder of a specific trust estate as general in nature, so as to apply it to
other general legacies); Shethar agt. Sherman, 65 How. Pr. 9, 14 (N. Y. 1883)
(Holding a specific bequest of certain railroad stock as a general gift so as
to abate pro rata with other general legacies). And see In re Stumpp's Estate,
153 Misc. 92, 274 K. Y. Supp. 466 (1934); Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138, 144
N. E. 481 (1934); and In re Smallman's 'Will, 138 Mise. 889, 247 N. Y. Supp.
593 (1931) preferring a certain pecuniary legatee over other general legatees
contrary to the usual principle which states that general legacies shall abate
pro rata. Myers v. Myers, 88 Va. 131, 13 S.E. 346 (1891).
13 The contents of the box were more than sufficient to pay all the debts,
death taxes, costs of administration, and the bequests to the general legatees.
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